INTRODUCTION
One of the most important factors aff ecting British politics is its membership to the European Communities (EC) and latter the European Union (EU), which has already had massive implications for this country. Th e relationship between Britain and Europe has always been problematic. In Britain there has been little enthusiasm for European integration per se, and equally little understanding of the enthusiasm felt on the continent. Europe has been seen as a menace rather than an opportunity and very few British politicians have attempted to argue (as is commonplace on the continent) about monetary union, for instance, it is the only way of regaining control over fi nancial policy. 1 Th e European idea of pursuing economic integration as a means to political union has also been met with blank incomprehension, if not outright hostility. Britain has always been attempting to slow down the process of integration and, consequently, has oft en fallen behind and had no choice but to catch up. 2 However, the portrayal of Britain as a "dif-fi cult partner" or "laggard leader" in European aff airs is only partly justifi ed. Based on its specifi c understanding of national sovereignty, Britain has developed a much more pragmatic and instrumental approach towards Europe than most of its partners on the continent. 3 Nevertheless, the country was a strong driving force in favor of integration in many crucial policy fi elds like the single market or trade policy. 4 According to Alan Milward, the process of European integration entails "pooling" the sovereignty in order to protect national interests and extend national governments' control of their own destinies. 5 In Britain, contrary to the continent, national interests dictated a diff erent line and it was only when exclusion from the Communities appeared to threaten them that the then British government began to accept the need for membership. Th e very diff erent motivation behind British entry ensured that the British aims inside the Communities would be limited or "defensive". 6 Th e most controversial aspect of Britain's membership of the EC has always related to "erosion" of its sovereignty.
Th is interpretation has been supported by those studies of British policy which have so far appeared. Sean Greenwood has emphasized that British governments before the 1960s were following their own interests in staying out of the emergent Communities. 7 According to John Young, Britain sought the development of European cooperation by means of "practical programmes" rather than "ambitious schemes" 8 . Finally, Stephen George has argued that successive British governments, both before and aft er 1973, and both Conservative and Labour, have pursued a consistent policy attempting to pursue regional cooperation on strictly intergovernmental lines, and attempting to prevent "regionalism" from disrupting "globalism" and "internationalism". 9 Nowadays Britain's departure from the European Union grows ever more likely. David Cameron will probably go into the 2015 general election with a commitment to renegotiate the terms of British membership and then hold a referendum on the outcome. Th e British people would vote whether to stay in the EU with the "better deal", or leave. Th e current British government has no intention of walking out of the EU. No political party that supports withdrawal has won even a single seat in the House of Commons. Th ere is nothing new about Britain being a grumpy member of the club, while quietly following EU directives with more diligence than many supposedly "good European" neighbours. However, it would be a mistake to assume, complacency, that sullen British acceptance of the status quo will continue indefi nitely. Th e relationship between the UK-EU nowadays looks much less stable than it has for a long time and it is hard to see any way in which the British public and political opinion will become more favourable over the coming years.
Th e aim of this article is to depict the nature of Britain's membership in the EC/EU (including the stance of the UK's main political parties on this issue) and to answer an important question: what future is there for the United Kingdom in the European Union? What are the possible scenarios of its membership in the EU? Th e fact that the UK is not a member of the euro -together with the threat that it might withdraw further from the EU can mean further marginalization of the UK which is, in short, a very awkward position. First, it stands to be disproportionately aff ected if it is side-lined under a banking union, because it is host to Europe's largest fi nancial center (a fact not universally welcomed in the eurozone, where a general feeling persists that the City of London and "unregulated Anglo-American fi nance" must be tamed if the single currency is to survive). Second, Britain is led by the most Eurosceptic government in the EU and David Cameron has diffi culty controlling his party. Th e result is that the stakes for the UK are higher than for any of the other eurozone countries, but the margin for compromise is narrower. 10
I. THE FIRST STAGES OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
Th e new Europe that emerged aft er the Second World War was driven by both politics and economics, but political considerations were the most important. Centuries of divisions and confl icts within Europe had convinced many of the need to end old antagonism and promote instead a new era of cooperation, peace and prosperity. 11 Th e prime motive of the architects of the new Europe was the prevention of war. While it was certainly hoped that closer European integration would help to rebuild agricultural and industrial production, a principal objective was to lock the economies of France and Germany so closely together as to render another war between them impossible. 12 Britain's wartime experience was very diff erent from that of the other European countries. Aft er the fall of France, Britain and its empire "stood alone". Its national institutions, sense of national identity emerged strengthened by the war. Th ere was no crisis of the nation -state in Britain. Moreover, the globalization of the war served to emphasize the importance of Britain's extra -European links. Th e empire and Commonwealth were crucial to Britain's survival. But it was only with the help of the Soviet Union and the United States that Britain was able to turn survival into victory. Th e fact that this country was the weakest of the "Big Th ree" merely underlined the importance of maintaining good relations with the emerging "superpowers". 13 British foreign policy was based on Th e Th ree Great Circles: the British Empire, the "English Speaking World", and "United Europe". 14 Th e deterioration of the international situation, accompanied by a thaw in Anglo -French relations, led to a revival in Britain's interest in western European integration in the years [1947] [1948] always been in the past, diff erent in character from other European nations and fundamentally incapable of wholehearted integration with them". 15 One of the major factors in kick -starting the European integration process was the Marshall Plan (1947). Its main aim was to provide American aid for the European recovery plan. But the Americans emphasized that "Th e initiative had come from Europe". 16 It was largely Ernest Bevin's determination which ensured the creation of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (the OEEC), which coordinated the national recovery plans of sixteen western European states and presented them to Washington as a single programme. 17 It is worth mentioning that by the time the Plan came to an end (1951), America had donated $ 13 bln, of which $ 2,7 bln went to Britain. 18 On 9 May 1950 the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announced a proposal (Th e Schuman Plan) to "pool" French and German coal and steel production under a supranational body "High Authority", as "the fi rst concrete foundation of a European federation". 19 Th ere were substantial reasons for British non -involvement in this initiative. In the fi rst place, the European economies were still devastated by the war. In coal and steel, Britain was more or less self -suffi cient and exported very little to Europe. On the other hand, Britain's exports to its major markets (the Commonwealth) were likely to suff er if Britain associated more closely with Europe. Secondly, the Labour government had nationalized coal and was committed to the nationalization of steel, whereas the Schuman Plan appeared to involve the formation of an eff ective cartel, run in the interests of industrialists. Th irdly, the British government had long made clear its preference for intergovernmental rather than supranational forms of integration. 20 Based on the Schuman Plan the Treaty of Paris was signed in April 1951. As a result of last -minute concessions to the Dutch, the European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC) was established and it was as much intergovernmental as supranational in character. 21 Again, for similar reasons, Britain did not take part in this initiative. An Anglo -ECSC Treaty of Association was eventually signed in 1954, but this provided only for a Council of association, exchanges of information and joint action on pricing and supplies. 22 Pressure from the coal and steel industries, trade unions, the Treasury and the Board of trade ensured that the proposal to move towards a common market in coal and steel was dropped.
On 25 March 1957 the leaders of "the Six" signed the two Treaties of Rome, establishing the European Economic Community (the EEC) and Euratom. Th e two new Communities came into existence on 1 January 1958. Undoubtedly, Th e EEC Treaty was by far the more signifi cant of the two, envisaging the abolition of internal customs duties, the erection of a common external tariff , free movement of capital and labour, the progressive integration of policies in areas such as agriculture, transport, trade and competition and the gradual realization of an "ever closer union" among the member -states. Th e fi rst round of tariff adjustments was scheduled for 1 January 1959. 23 Th e emergence of a potentially powerful economic bloc at the heart of Western Europe fi lled a number of British ministers with dismay. David Eccles declared that twice within living memory Britain had gone to war to oppose the formation of "a hostile bloc across the Channel". 24 Th e Brit-ish Prime Minister Harold Macmillan came up with a proposal (the socalled "Plan G") for an industrial free trade area linking "the Six" with the other eleven OEEC members. Th e plan deliberately excluded agriculture and allowed member -states to set their own tariff s against non -members (unlike the EEC). H. Macmillan insisted that the latter was fundamental: Britain could never agree "to our entering arrangements which, as a matter of principle, would prevent our treating the great range of imports from the Commonwealth at least as favourably as those from the European countries". 25 Understandably, the Europeans were unenthused. Th e French, in particular, suspected another attempt to undermine the common market negotiations. It soon became clear that "the Six" were uninterested in any proposal which excluded agriculture and external tariff s, and also that they wanted access to Commonwealth markets on equal terms with Britain.
Th e prospect of a trade war was a powerful inducement for Britain to join with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland in negotiating the European Free Trade Association (the EFTA), as an alternative to the EEC. 26 However, most historians have seen it as no more than a side -show or cul -de -sac on the route to British membership of the EEC. 27 It was conceived as an expedient and supported by the British government primarily to improve its bargaining position with "the Six". 28 In the short term, EFTA failed to fulfi ll its role as a "bridge -builder": the EEC countries refused to take it seriously. In the medium term, it was a diplomatic own -goal for Britain, as it set up another major obstacle to membership of the EEC. Th e EEC, by contrast, enjoyed rapid success. Despite British protests, the programme of tariff adjustments was accelerated. With the exception of Belgium, the EEC countries enjoyed economic growth rates much higher than Britain. 30 Britain's non -membership threatened to exclude it from some of the world's major growth markets, and leave it dependent on the Commonwealth, whose economies were increasingly successful at competing with British goods. 31 Political and economic developments combined to provoke reassessment of Britain's relations with Europe from mid -1959 onwards. Th e swift liquidation of the British Empire was one factor. Th e opposition of the USA and even some Commonwealth countries to the disastrous 1956 Anglo -French Suez crisis expedition was a defi ning moment, which destroyed lingering illusions of Britain's world power status. Continuing economic problems evidenced by low growth, adverse trade balances and the recurring sterling crises contrasted with the strong economic performance of the EEC countries. Th us Harold Macmillan's Conservative government sought entry in 1961. Th e decline in Britain's international standing and economic downturn was the main reasons for Britain's offi cial entry to the EEC in 1973.
II. AN OFFICIAL ENTRY TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1973)
A number of historians have concluded that Britain's application to join the EEC was an attempt to restore its deteriorating position in all three of its foreign policy's "circles". did not seem committed to Europe. For him, this had a particular meaning: Britain was too committed to the Commonwealth and the United States. His own vision of Europe as a "third force" would be fatally undermined by the entry of Britain, which he regarded as an America "Trojan Horse". 33 However, his critique of Britain's application went deep: in his view, "the nature, the structure of Britain made it fundamentally diff erent from the continent". 34 De Gaulle's veto was "a blow to the prestige of the Macmillan government from which the Conservatives did not really recover". 35 Most writers argued that Britain's fi rst application came too late: Britain had already missed the European boat. 36 Britain was not yet ready to make the adjustments necessitated by the EEC membership, while the EEC itself was still too young to accommodate the changes which British membership at that time might have entailed.
In 1964 the Labour Party came to power and Harold Wilson became prime minister. His election campaign had been resonant with images of modernization and "the scientifi c revolution". 37 However, he inherited a deteriorating economic situation from the Conservatives, which it then proceeded to make worse. Th e crux of the problem was the pressure on the pound caused by the balance of payments defi cit. Th e causes of this were long term and plentiful, including over -reliance on declining industries, lack of investment and low productivity. 38 As import controls were largely ruled out by international agreement (GATT) and the threat of retaliation. Britain could aff ord to retreat into a siege economy because its economic existence was dependent to an unusual extent on foreign trade. One of the possible solutions was devaluation of the pound, but H. wanted to avoid it. Instead, he negotiated a $2 billion loan from the USA, but to no avail. Th e worst crisis came in July 1966, when a national seamen's strike, compounding a depressing set of economic indicators, triggered a severe run on the pound. H. Wilson accepted the case for devaluation, but he recognized that it would be more acceptable to the British public and the international money markets if it were part of a whole package of measures, including membership of the EEC. Th e race was therefore on, to join the EEC before being forced to devalue outside. 39 A whole host of reasons conspired to edge Wilson towards launching a second British application: changes in the international sphere, in the Communities themselves, the hope of reversing Britain's economic decline and the need to fi nd a framework for the inevitable devaluation. Added to this were pressures from the Foreign Offi ce, the Confederation of British Industries, much of the press and European -minded pressure groups. 40 Th ere was also evidence of widespread public support for British membership. 41 Party politics also pointed to a renewed application. Th e March 1966 election gave Wilson more leeway to adopt his policies. Apart from it, a large number of the new intake of Labour MPs were known to be pro -European. Finally, a foreign policy "miracle" was needed to distract attention from diffi culties with the economy and other foreign policy areas. 42 On 2 May 1967 H. Wilson announced the government's intention to apply for membership. A week later there followed a three -day Commons debate. Th e result (488 to 62 in favour of the application) was never in doubt, given that the front benches of all two major parties supported the proposal. 43 A good example set Heath's plan for a common energy policy. Finally, he opposed an agreement on the distribution of energy resources within the EEC. With North Sea oil beginning to be developed, he saw it as a plot to deprive Britain of its oil. Generally, Heath steadily blocked progress in areas important to other countries, while demanding special treatment in areas of particular interest to Britain. By the time his government fell in 1974, Britain had already begun to acquire a reputation as an "awkward partner. " 55 However, this portrayal is only partly justifi ed. Th ere were some crucial areas in which Britain was one of the leading advocates. However, its national interest has always been put in fi rst place. Th at is why its participation in the European Communities has always been selective.
III. THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN ISSUE
British entry into the European club failed to settle the issue of its relations with Europe, for the British conversion to the European Communities was never whole -hearted. Th e economic benefi ts of the UK entry were not immediately obvious. Partly this was because Britain joined too late to infl uence the shape and early development of the European Communities. Th us the UK had to sign up to rules designed by others to 54 In May 1972 Britain joined the "snake" which linker European exchange rates, but pulled out the following month. Ibidem. meet the economic needs of the original six member states. Th e British economy with its relatively tiny agricultural sector was unlikely to benefi t signifi cantly from the Common Agricultural Policy, which then absorbed three -quarters of the EC budget. 56 Moreover, 1973, the year of Britain's entry, was also the year of the energy crisis which signaled the end of the post -war economic boom. Th e original members of the EC had enjoyed substantial growth in the early years of the UK membership which were accompanied by stagnation. 57 Th us Community membership remained politically controversial in Britain. Th e only mainstream political party consistently in favour, were the Liberals (and subsequently Liberal Democrats). Th e bulk of the Labour Party had opposed the entry in 1973. Th e return of their government under H. Wilson again in 1974 entailed a renegotiation of the terms of entry. In general, all that Britain was able to achieve was an agreement to review the bases of the pricing policy. Th e most diffi cult item in the negotiations was the size of Britain's budget contribution. 58 On 5 June 1975 a referendum took place, resulting in a 67,2% majority for staying in the EEC. 59 Although the government offi cially recommended a "Yes" vote, a third of the Cabinet campaigned on the opposite side and Labour remained deeply divided on the issue. On the British left the EC were widely perceived as a rich man's capitalist club, providing the economic underpinning of NATO. By 1983, and back in opposition, Labour was pledged to withdrawal from the EC without even a prior referendum. 60 Most Conservatives were then far more enthusiastic about Europe. Aft er all, Britain's membership in the EEC was their achievement. When Margaret Th atcher took offi ce in 1979, it would have been reasonable to expect 56 R. Leach With the budget question for the moment settled, "there were indications that, under M. Thatcher, Britain might be becoming more communautaire." 63 She went to sign and endorse the 1986 Single European Act, where the single market was to be achieved by 1992. 64 M. Th atcher portrayed this as a triumph of her diplomacy. Apart from the single market, majority voting would be introduced in specifi c areas, but not on such matters as taxation, frontiers controls and employment law. Most majority voting would be so -called "qualifi ed majority voting (two -thirds of the votes in the Council of Ministers). However, M. Th atcher was forced to accept a commitment to move towards economic and monetary union. Moreover, on the question of institutional reform, Th atcher did not appear to realize "the extent to which her acceptance of the Single Act brought her along the conveyor belt to closer union. " 65 Th atcher's refusal to agree 61 A. May, op.cit., p. 70. 62 Ibidem, p. 71. 63 S. Greenwood, op.cit., p. 11. 64 Th e proposal to complete the single market was set out in a British government document Europe -Th e Future. According to David Reynolds, Britain was afraid of the danger that it would be left on the sidelines in a "two -speed" Europe. A common market in services as well as goods, the removal of "non -tariff " barriers and the free movement of capital and labour fi tted in perfectly with Th atcher's commitment to deregulation and increasing opportunities for enterprise. D. Reynolds to the harmonization if indirect taxation continued to cause dissention within the Community, while her refusal to remove frontiers controls resulted in the inner core of Europe going ahead without her. 66 However, it was in accordance of Britain's national interest, because Britain wanted to keep its own immigration policy. As John Pinder has observed, rather than marking the limits of integration, as Th atcher hoped, the Single European Act contributed to the momentum of further change, by 'opening out new opportunities for the proponents of Union. " 67 M. Th atcher expressed her attitude towards Europe in the famous speech at Bruges in 1988. For her, Europe was a threat to Britain's national sovereignty: "to try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of the European conglomerate would be highly damaging(...)We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at a European level with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels" 68 Even so, M. Th atcher (reluctantly) agreed to UK entry to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in October 1990 and it was only aft er her fall from power soon aft erwards that her opposition towards the whole European project intensifi ed. Her successor, John Major seemed more enthusiastic about Europe. 69 However, the Maastricht Treaty (1992), creating the European Union, was to mark further divisions within the Conservative Party. Consequently, J. Major negotiated an opt -out from the Social Charter and monetary union 70 .
When the Labour Party came to power in 1997, it aimed to pursue a constructive European policy. Succesive Labour Party manifestos sought to establish some kind of British "leadership" within the European Union. According to S. Bulmer this policy could be defi ned as a 'utilitarian supra-nationalism' . Th e Labour governments'(with Tony Blair and Gordon Brown as the prime ministers) strategy has been characterised by a preparedness to embrace European policy solutions in line with Labour's 1997 manifesto commitment to pursue constructive diplomacy in the EU. 71 Th is policy has led to a stronger British imprint on the character of the EU. 72 Th e Labour governments have been able to pursue the national interest and their own political goals through European policy, and have done so unencumbered by the intra-party divisions that prevented such an approach under the Major government. Th us the Blair and Brown governments have exploited the opportunities which the EU off ers for resolving diffi cult policy issues: on matters ranging from economic competitiveness, through to security and defence policies. 73 However, this engagement in EU diplomacy has been bounded by electoral constraints. Th us the domestic strategy of utilitarian supranationalism has been designed to try to depoliticize the European issue in view of the British public's reluctant attitudes towards the EU. Utilitarian supranationalism therefore had an upstream component (the government's European diplomacy) and a downstream component (managing the salience of the European issue in domestic electoral politics). 74 Th e Labour Party's European Policy between 1997-2010 was to a large part about diff erentiating itself from its own policies prior to the modernization of John Smith and Tony Blair. But it was also about bringing a change to the deterioration of relations with EU partners under the second Major government (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) . Th e Blair and Brown governments 71 Th e European policy commitments in 1997 Manifesto were the following: a) rapid completion of the single market -top priority, b) high priority for enlargement of the EU, c) urgent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, d) retention of the national veto over key matters of national interest, such as taxation, defence and security, immigration, decisions over the budget and treaty changes, while considering the extension of Qualifi ed Majority Voting in limited areas where that is in Britain's interest. have been able to pursue a European diplomacy refl ecting the national interest as well as their own political goals. Seldom in the period of UK membership of the EU could a government pursue such a utilitarian approach to policy owing to intra-party division or a small parliamentary majority. 75 Labour reduced the electoral salience of European policy through a four-fold strategy. It sought to contrast its policies with the Conservatives in terms of its greater competence for defending the UK's interests, it isolated the most problematic issues from parliamentary politics by promising a referendum (the single currency, Constitutional Treaty) and it used delaying tactics (the single currency again). 76 Every eff ort was made to ensure European policy did not put at risk the parliamentary majority that was needed for Labour's wider political objectives. Labour's strategy of utilitarian supranationalism was evident from the 1997 Manifesto, with its commitment to 'lead reform' in the EU, while isolating the most problematic issues from the election campaign through the promise of a referendum. Th e fi rst term of the Blair government was the most successful. Th e establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Lisbon Agenda illustrated the constructive diplomacy and success at placing a British imprint on the EU. 77 Th e second term saw modest successes. Th e consequently more fractious relations with key partner states, such as France and Germany (due to Britain's engagement in the Iraq war), impacted on British European diplomacy.
Overall, there has been a reasonable achievement of the Blair governments' objectives in its European policy. Th e UK has been much less isolated in the EU. Th e EU itself has changed shape and was more in line with British goals, notably with its more neoliberal orientation. Th e Lisbon Treaty itself has a fi rm British imprint. Another development worth noting is that the UK has come closer to European patterns of governance. Devolution has brought the UK closer to the multileveled patterns of governance on the continent. Among other developments have been the greater practice of proportional representation (European elections, devolved 75 David Cameron, the prime minister (since 2010), is leader of the most eurosceptic Conservative Party ever. Even Margaret Th atcher had to reckon with a clutch of convinced pro -Europeans in her cabinet, whose resignation would have greatly damaged her. Today, Conservative MPs willing to defend the European status quo -as opposed to those who want a looser relationship with the EU. A central plank of modern Tory euroscepticism is the role that Europe played in M. Th atcher's loss of offi ce. A defi ning heroine to today's Conservative MPs was in part forced from offi ce by colleagues dismayed by her growing hostility to Europe in the latter days of her premiership. 80 Th is inheritance has pushed today's Conservative into a paradoxical relationship with the EU (especially the single market). With free trade, open markets and undistorted competition all key to the post -Th atcherite Tory identity -the majority of today's Conservative MPs regard the internal market as the most obvious net positive of EU membership. But many of the same MPs denounce supranational regulation by unelected Brussels bureaucrats at the European Commission as an evil. Th ey are unwilling to accept one thing: that without supranational regulators to police competition policy, state aid payments and non-tariff barriers to trade, and the single market would not last long. 81 78 Ibidem and S. Bulmer, M. Burch, Th e Europeanisation of UK Government: from quiet revolution to explicit step-change, http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/ typo3/site/fi leadmin/research%20groups/1/teamB-reader/Bulmer%20%26%20Burch_ Th e%Europeanization%20of%20UK%20government.pdf. Within the Conservative Party, two big, overlapping schools of thought now dominate. A smaller, hard -line faction is already convinced that single market access via full EU membership is not worth the price that must be paid in budget contributions and red tape. Th ey would like Britain to secure a free trade pact with the EU, turning the country into a bigger Switzerland. A larger group would like to use the evolving eurozone crisis to renegotiate with the EU lower -cost, lower -regulation membership fees. Both camps cite statistics about Britain's trade defi cit with the EU to argue that continent would have to negotiate a new deal, because Britain is too valuable a market to lose. 82 Since its refusal to sign the budgetary stability pact on which the 27 EU Member States came to agreement in December 2011, the British government has placed itself in a position of voluntary isolation in Europe. Apart from it, this decision also threatens the integrity of the single market. For more than fi ft y years, a fundamental principle of Britain's foreign policy has been to be present when EU bodies take decisions, so that it can infl uence the outcome. David Cameron has abandoned that policy. 83 Cameron's veto ended consistent acquiescence to the necessity of engagement. He prioritised party political interests ahead of national ones and he secured no safeguards for Britain. His hesitancy also adds to the doubt as to whether the EU can overcome its problems: failure to do so will be disastrous for Europe and for Britain. 84 David Cameron took the biggest gamble of his political career on 23rd January 2013 with a historic speech off ering the British people an in-or-out vote on membership of the European Union. He said he would negotiate a more fl exible arrangement with the EU which would include the repatriation of some powers -and then put the result to the British people in a simple in-or-out referendum in about fi ve years' time. 85 In his long- D. Cameron had to promise a referendum in order to maintain control of his own party. Had he failed to do so, the Conservatives' most eurosceptic backbenchers, who want a referendum to propel Britain out of the EU, would have become even more rebellious than they are already. And some Conservatives who want to stay in the EU believe that only a referendum can undermine the surge of support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which threatens to deprive the Tories of many seats at the next general election. 87 Promising an EU referendum is going to help him achieve his number one priority: re-election. D. Cameron may have increased his chances of winning an outright majority in 2015. But it depends: if he is deemed to have got a good deal for Britain, he will probably win the support of the British people and, more critically for him, the bulk of his party. He thinks that he will be able to achieve a deal that satisfi es the skeptics, neuters the rise of UKIP and keeps Britain in the EU. Th is is Cameron's biggest gamble. He outlined Britain's primary interest in being in Europe is the single market, called for the EU to do away with its commitment to "ever closer union". 88 Th e danger of D. Cameron's referendum strategy is that it assumes Britain's partners will allow it to "repatriate" powers in areas it dislikes. But they will not do so, because if one country was allowed to pick and choose the bits of the EU it subscribed to, others would demand the same privilege. Once countries were allowed to opt out of the rules they dislike, the single market would soon dismantle. So a Cameron -led government would risk returning from the renegotiation with a very minimal "better deal for Britain" that many in his own party would oppose in a subsequent referendum. 89 At the same time Ed Miliband, the Labour Party's leader, has so far avoided a precise commitment to an in-out referendum. But if Conservatives appear to profi t from their referendum promise, it will be hard for him to resist a similar pledge. If Labour won the next election having made such a promise, it could not credibly seek to renegotiate British membership, since it does not want to repatriate powers to the UK. So, a Labour government could fi nd it hard to win an in-out referendum with the terms of EU membership unchanged. 90 Even if Labour wins the next election opposing a referendum on EU membership, at some point in the future there will be another Tory government which will almost certainly hold such a referendum. Th erefore those who value Britain's membership should treat the Cameron's speech as a wake-up call to come up with a convincing agenda for reforming the EU and explain to the British people why they are better off in. 91 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Membership in the European Communities has had considerable implications for British parties and the party system. Both major parties have been split over Europe. Labour was deeply divided on the issue from the 1960s onwards. 92 Th ey became far more pro -European under T. Blair premiership. 93 Conservative divisions date back at least as far as Labour's, but were initially less disastrous for the party. Confl icting attitudes towards Europe caused tension within M. Th atcher's last administration, but became far more damaging under J. Major, threatening the survival of his government. Th ese divisions helped to undermine any immediate prospects of the Conservative Party recovery aft er the landslide defeat of 1997. 94 It is worth mentioning that the European issue has also spawned new parties with some impact on the British political scene. Th us the single issue Referendum Party appeared a threat to the Conservatives in 1997. Apart from it the UK Independence Party managed to win three seats in the European Parliament elections in 1999. 95 Britain initially failed to engage with the movement for European integration, because of a continuing illusion of world power status, the special relationship with the United States and continuing ties with the Commonwealth. One of the factors which impelled Britain to seek membership in the European Communities in the 1960s was the disparity between British economic growth rates and those of "the Six". Britain was unfortunate in entering the EC just when the economic crisis of the 1970s began to take eff ect. Its membership was therefore associated with economic dislocation and recession rather than growth. 96 Britain eventually joined the European Communities in 1973, but it was too late to have an infl uence on the EC institutions and policies.
Britain used to be perceived as an "awkward partner" in European aff airs. Th is view is only partly justifi ed. Based on its very specifi c understanding of national sovereignty, Britain has developed a much more pragmatic and instrumental approach towards European integration than most of its partners on the continent. Nevertheless, the country was a strong driving force in favor of integration in many crucial policy fi elds op.cit., p. 89. While Blair had ended one "opt-out" on the Social Charter, but negotiated another -on the incorporation of the Schengen agreement. Ibidem Britain's membership in the European Communities has always been selective, in accordance to its national interests only, mainly in the economic dimension. When exclusion from the Communities could threaten national interests, Britain has always accepted the need for its membership in the "United Europe".
Th e current British government has no intention of walking out of the EU, but it would be a mistake to assume that sullen British acceptance of the status quo will last forever. One way or another, the EU-UK relationship already looks much less stable than it has for a long time. Th e fact that Europe's fi nancial centre lies in London, is a permanent source of tension between Britain and its partners. Th e common view across continental Europe is that the City is a hotbed of speculators bent on destroying the euro, and that the British government is hostile to regulating markets. Quite contrary, in many areas of fi nancial regulation Britain was stricter than other European countries. 97 It is worth mentioning that Britain has already begun to disengage from the EU in the area of Justice and Home Aff airs (JHA). Th e Lisbon Treaty says that in 2014 Britain must accept the authority of the European Court of Justice over all existing rules on police and judicial cooperation -or opt out of them as a block. It may then seek to opt back into some of them if its partners agree. However, opting out of the European Arrest Warrant, Europol, Eurojust and exchanges of information among police forces would endanger national security. 98 A lot of eurosceptics regard the Swiss or Norwegian models as possible alternatives to EU membership. But it is not a viable option for Britain. Th e Norwegians are increasingly unhappy with the arrangement by which they have to adopt single market rules but that they cannot vote. Th e Swiss, too, have access to parts of the single markets, but their links with the EU have reached an institutional impasse. 99 A British exit from the EU would be hugely damaging to both Britain and the EU. Britain would lose the ability to shape the rules of the single market and perhaps access to parts of the market. It would therefore lose foreign investment (e.g. in the car industry and the City of London). And it would lose the ability to steer and benefi t from the EU's trade -opening deals with other key economies -such as South Korea, Canada, India, Japan, Singapore and the US. Britain would also have less ability to infl uence global diplomacy on issues ranging from climate change to the Iranian nuclear programme to the pacifi cation of Somalia. Some of the more federalist-minded European leaders would not be sorry to see the UK leave: it has always sought to slow or stop institutional reform or treaty change. But the majority of Europeans would regret a British departure. An EU minus Britain would be more inclined to protectionism and less interested in deepening the single market. Deprived of Britain's diplomatic clout, the EU would have less capacity to infl uence global security challenges. And any attempt to build an EU defence capacity without the UK would be very limited.
From the British perspective the most important is the economic factor, especially the country's trade relations. Th e European Union remains by far the biggest destination for UK trade in goods (with a 53.5% share exported to the EU). 100 Membership of the EU customs union and the free movement of goods with the absence of tariff s and rules of origin remains a benefi t to UK fi rms exporting to the EU. Th e UK has been instrumental in developing the Single Market in goods and promoting EU enlargement, which has helped to generate new markets, increased competition and reduced costs. From purely a trade perspective, EU membership remains 99 Ch. Grant, Britain's slide…, op.cit. 100 In services trade, the UK is less dependent on the EU market (39% of exports). Th e UK is also less reliant on the EU market than the other major member states but it relies on the EU to negotiate on its behalf for greater market access to third countries, with non-tariff barriers to trade of increasing importance. S. Booth, Ch. Howarth, Trading places: Is EU membership still the best option for UK trade? http://www.openeurope. org.uk/content/documents/pdfs/2012EUTrade.pdf. the best option for the UK. All the alternatives (like the Swiss, the Norwegian or the WTO option) come with major drawbacks and would all (except for the WTO option) require negotiation with and the agreement of other member states, which would come with unpredictable political and economic risks. Th is means that negotiating a new UK relationship with Europe outside the EU Treaties (i.e. leaving the EU), would present similar diffi culties such as renegotiating membership terms while remaining a member of the EU. Th erefore, there is not currently a compelling trade case for EU withdrawal. 101 However, there are three factors that could alter the cost-benefi t analysis of the EU in future: a) If EU trade liberalization stalls over the longterm, b) If the EU moves in a more protectionist direction in the wake of the eurozone crisis, c) If the EU prevents the UK from taking advantage of growth opportunities in non-EU countries in future trade talks (the UK relies on the EU to negotiate on its behalf, which can be a disadvantage if UK interests are watered down as part of an EU compromise deal. In light of these trends and an increasingly sceptical UK public the UK government should seek to achieve a new model for EU cooperation based on diff erent circles of EU membership. In this structure, the UK should remain a full member of the single market, but take a "pick and mix" approach in other areas of EU policy. Th is would achieve a vital reduction in the non-trade costs of EU membership (such as the EU budget), while allowing the UK to remain at the heart of the EU's cross-border trade. As the eurozone is likely to need a new set of EU Treaty arrangements to move towards further integration, which the UK must approve, Britain will have a unique opportunity to stake out its own model for EU membership. 102
